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Old Wine in New Wineskins?
Appraising Professor Bergelson's Plea for
Comparative Criminal Liability
Iffigo Ortiz de Urbina Gimeno*
Three decades ago, using the somewhat naive language of
the first generation of critical criminologists, Nils Christie com-
plained about "conflicts" being "taken away" from the commu-
nity.' The procedural model he offered as an alternative would
instead, "first and foremost," be "victim-oriented."2 Thirty years
later, it can be said that his plea for a victim-oriented criminal
justice system has been amply supported, though in all likeli-
hood not in the way he was hoping.3 Victim participation in
criminal law justice has undergone changes, especially in the
United States, and has drawn a great deal of attention among
academics as well. Most legal changes and academic discus-
sions, however, have focused on the victim's role in the criminal
process 4 and the general influence of the victim's perspective on
the elaboration of crime policy.5 The relevance of the victim's
* Visiting Professor of Criminal Law and Assistant Director, Law Depart-
ment, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Barcelona, Spain.
1. See Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1977).
2. Id. at 10.
3. I believe it is safe to assume that Christie was hoping for something similar
to restorative justice and its emphasis in victim-perpetrator-community interac-
tion. Id. at 10-12.
4. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic
Overview, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 3 (1999). Especially striking, from a foreign
perspective, is the degree of participation given to the victim in the criminal justice
system through her involvement in sentencing proceedings and parole hearings
via written victim impact statements and oral allocutions. For a balanced account
of the pros and cons of victim impact statements, see Trey Hill, Victim Impact
Statements: A Modified Perspective, 29 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (2005). On the
regulation and the importance of victim participation in parole hearings (offering
empirical evidence showing that victim participation exerts great influence upon
parole boards), see Kathryn Morgan & Brent L. Smith, Victims, Punishment, and
Parole: The Effect of Victim Participation on Parole Hearings, 4 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL'Y 333 (2005).
5. Reams of paper have been devoted to the study of this topic. For a particu-
larly lucid analysis, see DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001). See also Francis T. Cullen, Bon-
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conduct when attributing criminal liability remained compara-
tively underdeveloped in American criminal law.6 A general ap-
proach to the subject was largely lacking before Bergelson's
impressive 2005 contribution. 7
The analysis of victim conduct in substantive criminal law
could be said to represent the dark side of the moon of the vic-
tims' rights movement. The reforms experimented with by the
criminal justice system as a result of the victims' rights move-
ment are "victim-friendly" and have granted victims more
rights. Discussions on victim conduct in substantive criminal
law, however, tend to move in another (though not quite "the
opposite") direction. In substantive criminal law, victim con-
duct is usually analyzed to determine the extent to which it
should lead to a diminution or even an extinction of the perpe-
trator's own criminal liability.8 This is most obvious in the case
nie S. Fisher & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion About Punishment and Cor-
rections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 57-67 (2000) (offering a critique of the empirical basis
of the "that's-what-the-people-want" argument politicians so often use); Paul H.
Robinson, Should the Victim's Rights Movements Have Influence Over Criminal
Law Formulation and Adjudication?, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 749, 755-57 (2002)
(concluding that victim participation in the formulation of crime policy and in the
criminal justice process through victims' organizations is generally positive, but
victim participation in the adjudication of the victimizer's case is highly problem-
atic and can result in a loss of legitimacy).
6. The question has traditionally received more attention in European crimi-
nal law literature, though in a hidden kind of way. It has been studied under
many names and in the analysis of various topics such as causation, self-endanger-
ment, and culpability. See Manuel Cancio MeliA, Victim Behavior and Offender
Liability: A European Perspective, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 513 (2004) (offering an
exhaustive literature review, as well as some new proposals).
7. Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative
Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385 (2005) [hereinafter Bergel-
son, Victims].
8. This trend has been particularly evident in European criminal law for the
last thirty years. For an early compelling critique, see THOMAS HILLENKAMP, DER
EINFLUSS DES OPFERVERHALTENS AUF DIE DOGMATISCHE BEURTEILUNG DER TAT
(1983). Within criminology, victimology studies both the harm that crime causes
to its victims and the victim-offender relationship. These investigations have
shown the impressive number of victims that somehow "collaborate" in the crimes
committed against them. For a good review of the literature, see Bergelson, Vic-
tims, supra note 7, at 390-96. The importance of victim precaution for crime pre-
vention is a point also taken up by situational crime prevention, one of the latest
additions to the criminological canon. See SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: SUC-
CESSFUL CASE STUDIES (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 2d ed. 1997) (description of theoreti-
cal basis and a collection of studies showing the empirical support for the theory);
ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION (Andrew
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/9
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of proponents of the paradoxically named "victimological princi-
ple" who, contrary to victimology's original intention, propose
that protection through criminal law be denied to "undeserving
victims."9 At first glance, Vera Bergelson's proposal seems to
follow this trend of increasing the relevance attributed to the
victim's conduct. In fact, her thoroughly argued plea for the rel-
evance of comparative liability in criminal law would seem to
take it to the next level. However, this apparently broader con-
sideration of victim conduct owes much of its breadth to the fact
that Bergelson uses a victim concept different than the one used
by other commentators. Specifically, Bergelson's victims in-
clude both the consenting victim in cases of validly given con-
sent and the perpetrator-turned-victim of a self-defensive
action.
Bergelson starts off on the right foot when she states that
the widespread rhetorical denial of the significance of victim
conduct in the apportioning of criminal liability does not appro-
priately describe our legal systems.10 Far from being insignifi-
cant, Bergelson contends, victim conduct plays a decisive role in
a number of institutions, including some at the very core of
criminal law, such as self-defense, consent, and provocation. In
fact, the importance of victim conduct in these three institu-
tions had not escaped the attention of European commenta-
von Hirsch et al. eds., 2000) (contributions assessing legal and ethical problems
and possible unintended social effects).
9. See Bernd Schuinemann, Zur Stellung des Opfers im System der
Strafrechtspflege (II) 6 NSTZ 439 1986. "Undeserving victims" are victims of non-
violent offenses that can easily protect themselves but fail to do so. Id. at 439. The
victimological principle is said to be inferred from the ultima ratio principle. This
principle instructs to use criminal law as a last resort in order to maximize individ-
ual rights. It is thus ironic that a proposal similar to Schinemann's "victimologi-
cal principle" has been advanced from what could be viewed as the opposite
normative standpoint: the social-welfare perspective defended by some proponents
of the law and economics movement. See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in
Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82
CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1994). For a wonderfully condensed rebuttal of the latter propo-
sal, see Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 424-25.
10. I concur with Husak's powerful phrasing of this point: "[Alnyone who con-
tends that victim fault is and ought to be irrelevant in all cases simply does not
know what he is talking about." Douglas Husak, Comparative Fault in Criminal





tors. 11 What is unusual from a European perspective, however,
is her attempt to find a common underlying rationale. But the
fact that Bergelson's approach is unusual to the European eye
does not at all imply that it is faulty. Trying to ascertain what
different doctrines have in common in order to see whether it is
possible to make them all fall under the same principle or set of
principles can be a very useful strategy. One could in fact say
that such pursuit has been the very essence of European crimi-
nal law theory for some centuries now.12
The problem, pointed out by other commentators, 13 is that
Bergelson may be aggregating too much. Her unifying general
principle states that "the criminal liability of the perpetrator
should be reduced to the extent the victim, by his own acts, has
diminished his right not to be harmed by the perpetrator." 4 Ac-
cording to her, this principle underlies the doctrines of consent,
self-defense, and provocation and (almost inevitably) leads to
the admission of comparative fault in the criminal law field. In
the next sections, I will go through Bergelson's proposal build-
ing blocks. I will very briefly comment on consent (Section I)
and devote more space to the analysis of self-defense (Section II)
and provocation (Section III). I will conclude by analyzing the
methodological status of Bergelson's "conditionality of rights
principle" (Section IV).
11. See Winfried Hassemer, Riicksichten auf das Verbrechensopfer, in 2 FEST-
SCHRIFT FUR ULRICH KLUG ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 217, 218 (Gunter Kohlmann ed.,
1983); Jesds Maria Silva Sinchez, Consideraciones Victimol6gicas en la Teoria
Juridica del Delito? Introducci6n al Debate Sobre la Victimodogmdtica, in CRIMI-
NOLOGfA Y DERECHO PENAL AL SERVICIO DE LA PERSONA: LIBRO-HOMENAJE AL
PROFESOR ANTONIO BERISTAIN 633, 635 (Jos6 Luis de la Cuesta et al. eds., 1989).
12. This is an endeavor pursued with some exaggeration. On the methodolog-
ical standpoint of German criminal law theory (by far Europe's most influential
criminal law theory), see Marcus Dirk Dubber, The Promise of German Criminal
Law: A Science of Crime and Punishment, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1049 (2005); Wolfgang
Naucke, An Insider's Perspective on the Significance of the German Criminal The-
ory's General System for Analyzing Criminal Acts, 1984 BYU L. REv. 305 (effec-
tively delivering the insider's perspective promised in the title).
13. See Alon Harel, Victims and Perpetrators: The Case Against a Unified
Theory of Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 489, 490,
494-99 (2005); Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Victim Conduct in Tort and
Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 541, 562 (2005).
14. Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 456.
818 [Vol. 28:815
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I. Consent's Magic Erasure of Victim Status
Nobody has explained the astonishing effects of consent
better than Heidi Hurd. According to her:
[C]onsent in many circumstances is "morally magical": by itself it
alters the moral ontology of another's act, making it altogether
impossible to describe that act as involving even a prima facie
rights violation. Thus, consent turns a rape into love-making, a
kidnapping into a Sunday drive, a battery into a football tackle, a
theft into a gift, and a trespass into a dinner party.15
The magic of consent is not merely moral. When trans-
posed to the legal setting, a legally valid consent dramatically
changes the legal consequences of the conduct involved. In this
case too, it is difficult to describe the act as involving even a
prima facie rights violation. And if there is not even a prima
facie rights violation, what sense does it make to talk about a
victim? Bergelson agrees that consent magically transforms the
perpetrator's conduct. Why then does this magic stop at the
perpetrator and not extend to the victim? Can we meaningfully
deny the existence of a perpetrator whilst affirming the pres-
ence of a victim? I highly doubt it. Bergelson herself is aware
that the criminal law institutions she uses to illustrate her
point regarding the general relevance of victim conduct are
sharply divided by the issue of the voluntariness of the victim's
right reduction. In the event of consent, the victim loses or di-
minishes her rights voluntarily, whereas in self-defense and
provocation, the victim loses them involuntarily. That is why in
the former cases Bergelson only requires consent to be valid in
order for the conduct of the victim to have legal significance,
whereas in the latter cases, she demands that the victim should
infringe a legally recognized right of the perpetrator. 16 This
makes a big difference. In other words, the voluntary reduction
15. Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal That
Criminal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 503, 504 (2005) (footnote omitted). For a complete account of Profes-
sor Hurd's views, see Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY
121 (1996).
16. See Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 389.
2008] 819
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cases are related to the victim's conduct, whereas the involun-
tary reduction cases are related to the victim's faulty conduct.17
This idea is also supported by Harel's accurate observation
that, in the case of consent, the legal system's aim is to advance
the consenting person's autonomy, whereas in self-defense and
provocation it is to protect third parties.'8 Turning to rights
theory, the criminal law regulation of valid consent grants the
consenting party a power in Hohfeldian terms, that is, by con-
senting, she grants the consent recipient a privilege. 19 The ac-
tual exercise of that power (actually consenting) cancels the
consent's recipient duty to the awarding party. However, this
does not mean that the recipient has a right in the strictest
sense of the term, for the consenting party has no duty not to
get in the way of the consent recipient and may even oppose the
recipient's action (a conduct that may be considered sufficient
proof of the withdrawal of consent unless the circumstances in-
dicate otherwise).20
17. See Husak, supra note 10, at 523 n.3 (stating that he will focus on Bergel-
son's thesis of faulty conduct on the part of the victim, thus not addressing the
cases of consent). See also Simons, supra note 13, at 544 (stating that only provo-
cation necessarily involves fault, since self-defense is triggered by a wrongful
threat and this could come from a nonculpable person such as a child or an insane
person).
18. See Harel, supra note 13, at 496.
19. JUDITH JARviS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 44 (1990). In this contri-
bution, I will use Thomson's account of Hohfeldian notions, because it avoids some
minor inconsistencies incurred by Hohfeld himself. Id. at 53. For Hohfeld's origi-
nal account, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26
YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
20. I beg the reader not to immediately think about the consent to sex case;
"no means no" and apparent opposition almost invariably means no, too (almost:
one cannot rule out the possibility of apparent opposition being part of the con-
sented sexual behavior of adults). I invite the reader to think about a Karate in-
structor consenting to be attacked by one of his students and then skillfully
evading his attempts to kick him. In these circumstances, the student may reason-
ably infer that this opposition does not imply withdrawal of consent. The student
does not have the right to attack the instructor because there is no duty on the
instructor's part to endure the attack. According to the Hohfeldian account, the
student does not have a right, but a privilege, which means that, were the student
to successfully hit his instructor, the latter would have no claim against him (this
is indeed the otherwise not so obvious practical relevance of having a privilege).
See THOMSON, supra note 19, at 52.
820
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Bearing in mind that voluntariness is the force driving the
moral magic of consent, one should be very careful when placing
consent in a group together with institutions that pursue the
protection of one's interests against other parties' faulty con-
duct. The underlying rationales are very different, almost op-
posed, and this enormously complicates the search for a
common principle with substantive content. 21
II. Aggressor's Conduct in Self-Defense Settings:
A Hohfeldian Power?
I will begin the analysis of victim conduct in self-defense
cases by offering an argument about the impropriety of calling
the unsuccessful attacker a victim. I am quite surprised that
even commentators willing to deny the victim condition to con-
senting parties find it perfectly logical to talk about a victim in
the self-defense case. Harel, for instance, states that:
It would be awkward to describe John as a victim if John agreed
or invited Suzanne to enter his house .... In contrast, it would be
natural to describe John as a victim if he is killed (permissibly) by
Suzanne in self-defense. Even if his killing is justifiable, John is
still a victim although his status as a victim resulted from his own
actions.22
I think this statement should be qualified. People injured
or killed in self-defense certainly qualify as victims in common
parlance. The mere fact that they have sustained an injury or
may even be dead places them in a larger group of victims to-
gether with victims of earthquakes and skiing accidents. But
are they victims in the eyes of the criminal justice system?
Should they be considered as victims in terms of criminal law
theory? I think the answer to both questions is no. In these
narrower terms, talking about a victim would seem to require
the existence of a perpetrator, that is, of someone who has com-
mitted a criminal wrong. Self-defense, however, excludes the
existence of such a criminal wrong. Many victim public com-
pensation schemes in Europe accordingly foresee a "public or-
der" or "justice" exception to payment when the victim is the
21. This also explains the different meaning of consent in terms of rights the-
ory, which is explained in the next section. See infra Part II.




perpetrator himself or one of his accomplices. 23 I have already
expressed my doubts regarding the fact of talking about a vic-
tim in cases of consent. 24 The use of the word in the self-defense
setting already implies two problematic uses of the word
"victim."
My second point addresses the proper conceptualization of
self-defense under the theory of rights. Alon Harel understands
the principle of conditionality of rights as stating that in con-
sent, self-defense, and provocation, individuals have a
Hohfeldian power to reduce or extinguish the duties of others
towards them.25 I am afraid Harel's conceptualization grants
Bergelson too much. 26 It does so by suggesting that all these
criminal law institutions have the same structure in terms of
the theory of rights, thus lending implicit support to the "one
underlying principle" idea.27 However, neither self-defense nor
some instances of provocation (those in which the provoking act
is legal) meet the Hohfeldian definition of power.
Let's think about some of the examples of powers granted
to individuals offered by Harel: "IT]he power of a person to ac-
cept an offer and thus create a binding contract, or the power to
appoint an agent who is authorized to conduct legal transac-
tions on one's behalf."28 For color, let me add the power to get
23. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN JUDICIAL NETWORK, COMPENSATION
TO CRIME VICTIMS, http://ec.europa.eulciviljustice/comp-crime-victim/comp-crime_
victim-gen.en.htm (last visited February 27, 2008).
24. That is, when consent excludes criminal liability.
25. Harel, supra note 13, at 491-94. According to Hohfeld, a power is "an abil-
ity to cause, by an act of one's own, an alteration in a person's rights, either one's
own rights or those of another person or persons, or both." See THOMSON, supra
note 19, at 57.
26. In all fairness, Harel does include a proviso stating:
[W]hat is characteristic of cases covered by the principle of conditionality of
rights is not merely the fact that the victim can reduce or extinguish the
duties owed to him but that it is the victim's action that has such a power
rather than a state of affairs than can be brought about by the victim's
actions.
Harel, supra note 13, at 493. However, this proviso does not relate to what I am
about to say.
27. Bergelson herself says she is grateful to Harel "for bringing up Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld's typology and showing where the principle of conditionality of
rights fits into it." Vera Bergelson, Conditional Rights and Comparative Wrongs:
More on the Theory and Application of Comparative Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 567, 572 (2005) [hereinafter Bergelson, Conditional Rights].
28. Harel, supra note 13, at 491.
822 [Vol. 28:815
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married to the list. Following von Wright,29 modern analytical
jurisprudence distinguishes between deontic and constitutive
norms.30 Deontic norms, on the one hand, purport to direct the
agent's behavior by forbidding, imposing, or allowing the con-
duct they refer to (by "deontically qualifying" that conduct).31
Constitutive norms, however, do not purport to direct the
agent's behavior, at least not directly. The legal system is not
particularly interested in whether you use the power conferred
or not. It doesn't really matter whether you finally enter into a
contract, appoint an agent, or marry. Due to practical reasons,
the legal system is highly interested in having the power to uni-
laterally determine what legal effects these institutions have,
that is, to determine what entering into a contract, having an
agent, or marrying means in legal terms. You may or may not
get married, but once you do you cannot determine what the
legal effects of marriage are or how being married affects your
rights and those of others. Tellingly, all of Harel's examples are
instances of these constitutive or "power-conferring" norms.
One of the characteristics of power-conferring norms is that
they do not foresee sanctions in the event that they are not com-
plied with, at least not in the traditional sense of the term
"sanction." If you don't comply with the power-conferring norm,
you don't have to pay a fine or suffer any other kind of punish-
ment. What happens is that you simply do not get the desired
legal effect. If you don't comply with the requirements estab-
lished for entering into contracts, appointing agents, or mar-
rying, you just don't have a valid contract, agency mandate, or
marriage.
In order to get a clearer picture of this, let's focus on the
contract case and compare it to the self-defense case. If you do
not use the power to enter into contracts as established by the
power-conferring norm (the norm establishing the requirements
29. GEORG H. VON WRIGHT, NoRM AND ACTION: A LOGICAL INQUIRY (1963).
30. See JOSEP J. MORESO & JOSEP M. VILAJOSANA, INTRODUCCION A LA TEORtA
DEL DERECHO 65-69 (2004).
31. Permissions do not actually direct the agent's conduct; rather, they allow
him the freedom to decide what is best to do in that situation. Permissions can,
however, be pragmatically relevant when the conduct was previously prohibited or
compulsory. They can also be pragmatically relevant inasmuch as they bound
lesser authorities. See MANUEL ATIENZA & JUAN A. Ruiz MANERO, LAs PIEZAS DEL




needed to enter into a contract), the contract will be invalid.
Nevertheless, the conduct of invalidly entering into a contract is
by itself legal. 32 This is surely not what happens in the self-
defense case. Wrongfully attacking someone else is ab initio for-
bidden. The legal system is not indifferent to whether people
wrongfully attack others or not; it positively seeks people not to
act in that manner at all. The legal system does not grant at-
tackers the power to diminish their rights through their wrong-
ful conduct; it forbids them to act that way. This leads to a
second and crucial difference between the two situations.
In the cases of power-conferring norms, the legal system al-
lows for the possibility that you will legally get the result you
intended. If you follow the indications set out by the legal sys-
tem, you will have a valid contract, agency mandate, or mar-
riage. In the self-defense setting, however, the legal system
does not foresee that you can carry on with your wrongful at-
tack and (legally) get what you want. Conversely, it instructs
you to stop doing what you are doing and grants others the
right to stop you even when doing this results in serious disad-
vantage for you. The deontic status of the "victim's" conduct
radically distinguishes the cases of consent and self-defense. It
is not only a matter of the voluntariness or involuntariness of
the diminution of rights, but also a matter of how that conduct
is regarded by the legal system. The deontic status awarded to
the conduct by the legal system sharply differentiates consent
from the wrongful attack leading to self-defense. You may or
may not consent to sex. In either case you remain within the
law and you enjoy legal protection. But you may not wrongfully
attack. Harel (and Bergelson) are mistaken in considering that
the assailant has a power in Hohfeldian terms. His conduct
does have "an ability to cause by an act of one's own, an altera-
tion in a person's rights, either one's own rights or those of an-
other person or persons or both"33 but this is only part of the
Hohfeldian story. According to the Hohfeldian notion of power,
32. Another norm may specify that some types of contractual vices, like
threatening the other party, may carry a sanction. However, that is a different
norm (it will usually belong to another legal text, too) and what it actually does is
declare such conduct forbidden: you may or may not enter into a contract, but you
simply may not threaten the other party.
33. THOMSON, supra note 19, at 57.
824 [Vol. 28:815
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"no power is correlative with a duty."34 Can we really say that
the attacker has no duty to omit the act that alters the attacked
party's rights? This strikes me as absurd; of course he does.
Thus, it cannot be said that the attacker has a power in the self-
defense setting.
There is a sense in which it could be said that the legal
system grants a power in the self-defense setting. Nonetheless,
it is not granted to the perpetrator, but to the victim of the
wrongful aggression (that, remember, is not the victim in
Bergelson's analysis).35 The legal system stops holding the vic-
tim's conduct to a prohibitory norm by granting him a permis-
sion to act. That permission is a privilege in Hohfeldian
terms. 36 The situation is similar to the one in the power-confer-
ring norm. Just as you may or may not use the power awarded
to you, you may or may not use the permission to act in self-
defense. You may choose to defend yourself or to sacrifice your
life; no matter what you choose to do, your conduct remains le-
gal. But it is you, not the attacker, who has that choice.
34. Id. at 59.
35. In her response to Husak's criticism, Bergelson approvingly quotes him,
saying that the principle of conditionality of rights "require[s] the offender to have
the right that the victim not behave as she does . . . ." Bergelson, Conditional
Rights, supra note 27, at 582 (emphasis added). However, according to her analy-
sis in the self-defense cases, the offender is the victim whose conduct alters the
rights of the parties in the situation. I take Bergelson's slippage to be a sign of
how difficult it is to meaningfully talk about the aggressor as a victim in self-de-
fense settings.
36. THOMSON, supra note 19, at 44. It is important to see that the defending
party does not have a right in the strictest sense. The difference is elsewhere rec-
ognized by Bergelson:
[A] privilege is merely one's freedom from the right or claim of another; its
correlative is not a duty but a "no right." If Y unlawfully attacks X, X may
use force in self-defense. X acts under a privilege, and Y has no right that X
not act that way. On the other hand, Y does not have a duty to stay put and
let X kill him. Y may quite lawfully run away.
Vera Bergelson, Rights, Wrongs, and Comparative Justifications, 28 CARDOzo L.
REV. 2481, 2489 (2007) [hereinafter Bergelson, Rights]. It is also clear that Y has a
duty not to attack X, since X poses no wrongful threat to Y. However, I believe
that Y could act against X and still be awarded a necessity defense. His action,
however, would have to be defensive and cannot suppose any serious disadvantage
to X. Y may, for instance, hold X until he calms down at the same time that he




The previous discussion has focused on the status of self-
defense according to the theory of rights. It has shown that the
conduct of the attacker in self-defense settings is viewed as
something completely different from the conduct of the other
two victim categories in Bergelson's analysis. This does not
prove anything, though it does show that a principle covering
these three instances would have to be formulated in extremely
broad terms. However, before addressing this problem, allow
me to analyze Bergelson's final building block: provocation.
III. Less Wrongful or More Understandable? Bergelson's
Thought-Provoking Analysis of Provocation
Provocation may adopt three different forms. First, it may
constitute an immediate wrongful threat. This is the least
problematic case since whenever A's conduct constitutes an im-
mediate wrongful threat to B, he may react in self-defense. On
the other side of the spectrum, some instances of provocation
are legal in essence. If A informs B that she is having an affair
with B's spouse, B may quite understandably be angry, but A's
conduct does not constitute an immediate wrongful threat nor is
it illegal. The third possibility is that provocation is by itself
illegal but does not constitute an immediate wrongful threat (or
at least not any more): A may shout out loud in a bar that she is
having an affair with B's spouse, or she may spit in B's face and
subsequently turn around and slowly and peacefully make her
way to the door. In either case, after the shouting and spitting,
there isn't an immediate wrongful threat or an illegal action.
What should we do in these two groups of cases? Let me start
with an obvious observation. We all know that some instances
of provocation may make people lose their temper. Neverthe-
less, we still believe that they should have acted in a different
way (otherwise we would grant them a complete defense). The
problem is how to maximize these conflicting interests. I agree
with Bergelson that in order to do it we have to take into ac-
count both the conduct of the provoker and the conduct of the
provoked party. Still, I would argue that this doesn't force us to
affirm the existence of partial justification on the part of the
provoked party.
Bergelson asks herself whether in provocation we reduce
the defendant's punishment because of his own state of mind or
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12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/9
OLD WINE IN NEW WINESKINS?
because the conduct of the victim makes him partially responsi-
ble for the harm suffered.37 I believe that we do it for the former
reason, whereas she believes that at least in some cases we do it
for the latter. Specifically, consistent with her specification of
the conditionality of rights principle for involuntary rights re-
duction cases, Bergelson believes that provocation is a partial
justification whenever the provoker violates the provoked
party's legal rights. 38 She also admits that in the rest of cases
the perpetrator could still see his liability reduced through a
partial excuse. 39 Differentiating the conceptual nature of an in-
stitution and stating that it may sometimes function as a justi-
fication and other times as an excuse is uncommon but not
unknown.40 However, before agreeing to it, one should carefully
examine whether it is possible to prevent this result and offer a
unitary account of the institution.41 Most American commenta-
tors concur with me that provocation is best understood as a
matter of excuse.42 Still, vote counting is no substitute for argu-
ment, so let's turn to the complex differentiation between justi-
fication and excuse.
On the justification-excuse divide, Bergelson seems to sup-
port Austin's famous proposal: "In the one defense Ijustifica-
tion], briefly, we accept responsibility but deny that it was bad;
in the other [excuse], we admit that it was bad but don't accept
37. Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 409.
38. In these cases "it is the act that is less wrongful, not simply the actor that
is less culpable." Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
39. See Bergelson, Conditional Rights, supra note 27, at 583.
40. A majority of European commentators and some criminal codes support
the "differentiation theory" regarding the necessity defense. According to this the-
ory, necessity can function either as a justification (when the harm avoided is
clearly greater than the harm caused) or as an excuse (when the harm avoided is
not clearly greater than the harm caused but is somehow understandable). The
German criminal code (Strafgesetzbuch) follows this approach: § 34 regulates ne-
cessity as justification (when the harm avoided is clearly greater than the harm
caused) and § 35 regulates necessity as excuse (restricted to avoidance of physical
harm and liberty restrictions endangering the agent herself or close persons). On
the German regulation, see 1 GUNTER STRATENWERTH & LOTHAR KUHLEN,
STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 165-174, 221-25 (5th ed. 2004).
41. Since the consideration of a conduct as justified rather than excused car-
ries practical consequences, such as the extent of the powers granted to the acting
party, this is not merely a theoretical endeavor.
42. Bergelson admits that hers is a minority view in the United States. See




full, or even any, responsibility. '" 43 Although this formula is sel-
dom referred to by European commentators, I also support Aus-
tin's view (to my students' satisfaction, I must add). In what I
take to be the best interpretation of his statement, "denying
that it was bad" means just that, the act was not bad and does
not further mean that it was good. But so polemic an issue as
this may be,44 it just concerns the proper limits of justification
(though it indirectly affects the distinction between justification
and excuse through the number of instances that qualify for jus-
tification). What is important now is to focus on the difference
between "not bad" and "understandable."
The fact that the provocation defense demands the exis-
tence of certain (passionate) mental states on the defendant's
part provides a compelling argument for the excusatory charac-
ter of provocation. 45 If we were talking about a justification,
why should they be required? Bergelson cleverly retorts by say-
ing that, were it all a matter of passion, we could make no sense
of the law's demand that the provoked party should react
against the provoker and no one else.46
Bergelson's argument starts off on the right foot, but is ulti-
mately unconvincing, because it incorrectly interprets the point
43. J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 176 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock
eds., 2d ed. 1970) (1961).
44. This is a highly contested issue. Prominent commentators have defended
both interpretations. The issue was the subject of an interesting exchange be-
tween Professors Fletcher (defending the position that an act has to be right to be
justified) Dolinko, and, later on, Dressler (defending the "justified as not bad"
view). See George P. Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a
Justification or an Excuse?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1355 (1979); David Dolinko, Intolera-
ble Conditions as a Defense to Prison Escapes, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1126, 1178-81
(1979); Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the
Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV.
61, 69-76 (1984). Although a majority of commentators do not state their opinion, I
take Fletcher's view to be prevalent in Europe. The contending opinion is de-
fended by Enrique Gimbernat and Claus Roxin, considered by many to be the most
eminent Spanish and German commentators of the last fifty years. See ENRIQUE
GIMBERNAT ORDEIG, El Estado de Necesidad: Un Problema de Antijuridicidad, in
ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PENAL 228 (3d ed. 1990); 1 CLAus ROXIN, STRAFRECHT ALL-
GEMEINER TEIL 600 (4th ed. 2006). Bergelson herself endorses the "justification as
not bad" view. See Bergelson, Rights, supra note 36, at 2484, 2492-95.
45. See Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense? Some Reflections
on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 971-72 (2002).
46. See Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 412-19. She is joined in this cri-
tique by Heidi Hurd. See Hurd, supra note 15, at 505-06.
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of excuses according to Austin's formula. Most of us do not un-
derstand the acts of mentally ill people. What we understand is
the more general fact that they are mentally ill. The idea be-
hind Austin's excuse definition is that the person to be excused
could have controlled himself.47 Though some people acting
under provocation (or duress) may reach the state of temporary
mental insanity, most do not and are, as far as we know, capa-
ble of acting otherwise. Since they are acting under extraordi-
nary, unfortunate circumstances, however, we also know it will
be difficult for them to do so. In these circumstances, we have
to decide how much to demand from them, taking into account
that fairness to third parties is also involved. That is the reason
why a number of codes throughout the world require the excuse
to be reasonable. We rapidly understand that people may feel
tempted to react against their provokers. They did provoke
them, and, depending on the nature of the provocative act, it
may well be reasonable to be mad at them. We want them to
resist provocation, but at the same time, we understand that it
may be difficult to do so. If they succumb to their anger we find
good reasons to award them some kind of responsibility diminu-
tion. It would be much more difficult, or rather plainly impossi-
ble, to understand why on earth they would ever want to react
against some other person that did nothing to them; reacting
against that person would be unreasonable. 48 Since it is also
extremely unfair towards those third persons, the legal system
does not award any diminution of responsibility to sane people
reacting against third parties. Contrary to Bergelson's opin-
47. I think this is strongly suggested by the wording Austin chose: "we ac-
cept," "we deny," "we admit." See AUSTIN, supra note 43, at 176. I believe it is
highly reasonable as well. See also Dressler, supra note 45, at 972-73.
48. Note that this does not preclude the discussion in cases where the inno-
cent party has not done anything to the assailant, but yet she does "stand in the
way." I am thinking about cases like running out of a movie theatre to escape a
rapidly expanding fire and pushing other escaping people in the process. I do not
argue that the assailant should be completely excused, but the fear for his life may
afford him some understanding (and responsibility diminution) on our part. Were
he not merely to push people but to subsequently kick them, our understanding
may well cease. Kicking people in these circumstances is not at all understanda-





ion,49 the doctrine of misdirected retaliation can be fully ex-
plained on excusatory grounds.
In the situations of provocation we are analyzing there is
no reason to award the attacker a complete justification because
he is not being wrongfully attacked by the provoker. Through
the immediate wrongful attack requirement, the legal system
clearly elucidates the proper limits of that defense. It also
clearly sends a message that in the absence of an immediate
wrongful attack, it wants the provoked person to abide by the
law and not to attack his provoker. Since nobody has proposed
awarding a complete defense in these cases, this conclusion
holds whether we take provocation to be a matter of justifica-
tion or excuse. In either case, the reaction of the provoked party
will be (partially) wrongful and thus forbidden. This leads to
another problem. Bergelson does not consider the possibility
that the provoker-then-attacked will be able to overcome the
provoked party's attack. Although she suggests that the pro-
voked party would at most be partially justified, his conduct
would still remain wrongful. The question arises whether the
provoker would have a self-defense claim. Were the provoker
able to evade any criminal responsibility by claiming complete
self-defense, he would have less incentive to avoid engaging in
provoking conduct, and third parties would see their possibili-
ties to assist the provoked person greatly reduced because the
now self-defending provoker's conduct would be justified. This
would be a distressing result that is safely avoided by the solu-
tion provided by the Spanish criminal code.
Section 20.4 of the Spanish criminal code regulates self-de-
fense and provides that in case of provocation, the provoker
does not have a claim of complete self-defense; rather it is di-
minished to a claim of partial self-defense. Thus, his conduct is
still considered wrongful but his punishment will be signifi-
cantly diminished. 50 The Spanish criminal code does not say
anything specific about the provoked party. It is considered
49. Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 417-19.
50. Simple homicide, for instance, carries a sentence of 10-15 years of impris-
onment. C.P. § 138. In the presence of a partial defense, according to Section 68,
the penalty has to be reduced either one or two degrees. C.P. § 68. In the case of
simple homicide, this would mean a penalty of 5-10 years (one degree reduction) or
2.5-5 years (two degrees).
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that, given the case, his responsibility will be diminished ac-
cording to the general rules regarding culpability diminution.
In sum, with this solution the victim's conduct does indeed
change the legal scenario in terms of the justificatory claims
awarded to the attacker and the attacked party. However, it
does so not by awarding a partial justification to the provoked
party, but through the denial of complete justification to the
provoker. In the provocation setting, Bergelson seems to act in
a "zero sum game" assumption: if the provoker sees his justifi-
catory claims diminished, the provoked party must see them
amplified. But this is surely not a conceptual necessity, and I
hope I have shown it is not the best solution that the legal sys-
tem can offer either. The denial of complete justification to the
provoker and the eventual diminution of the provoked party's
responsibility on excusing grounds offer a better global solution
to this problematic situation.51
IV. The Conditionality of Rights Principle
After reviewing the doctrines of consent, self-defense, and
provocation, Bergelson concludes that her analysis "demon-
strates a common principle underlying all three defenses and
perhaps criminal law in general-the principle of conditionality
of our rights."52 I concur with Husak that this principle forms
"the philosophical cornerstone of her thesis about the signifi-
cance of victim fault to perpetrator liability."53 I also agree that
what it exactly means is not entirely clear and needs further
explanation. In this section, I will address some of the problems
faced by this principle to ultimately conclude that it is devoid of
51. This perspective actually helps Bergelson's proposal overcome one of
Husak's perceived "conceptual perplexities." According to Husak, "[i]f the perpe-
trator does not contravene any rights of his victim because the victim has lost
whatever right the perpetrator might otherwise infringe or violate, victim fault
should be a complete defense to crime." Husak, supra note 10, at 531 (emphasis
added). The problem lies in the "whatever right." As shown by the Spanish crimi-
nal code solution, people need not lose whatever right. They may lose some, such
as the claim of complete self-defense, while retaining others, such as the claim of
partial self-defense. Husak's observation seems to imply that Bergelson believes
her comparative criminal liability defense can only be partial, but this is not cor-
rect, as Bergelson herself has noted. See Bergelson, Conditional Rights, supra
note 27, at 570-71.
52. Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 465.




substance and thus cannot offer any guide in the resolution of
practical problems. I will divide my analysis in two subsections.
The first one analyzes the conditionality of rights principle from
the viewpoint of rights theory. The second and final subsection
addresses its substantive content.
A. The Conditionality of Rights Principle According to Rights
Theory
According to Husak,54 the principle of "conditionality of
rights" can be interpreted as a species of the "rights specifica-
tion" thesis.55 Since I highly sympathize with that thesis, I was
pleased to read it.56 I was understandably disappointed when I
then read that Bergelson herself thinks that "the theory of
rights I employ is anything but specification."57 One question
immediately arises: Who is right? Nevertheless, I believe a sec-
ond question to be more important: Does it really matter who is
right? I think it is doubtful that it does. Specifically, I believe
that Bergelson's conditionality of rights principle does not need
to rely on any particular thesis as long as it is compatible with
the more general assertion that there are no absolute rights.
Still, I also believe that Bergelson's rejection of rights specifica-
tion theory on the grounds that it is incompatible with the view
that rights are not absolute is premature. Let's take this step
by step, beginning with this latter remark: Is Bergelson right
when she asserts that specification theory assumes rights to be
absolute?
Let me begin with a transatlantic comparison. Using the
specification thesis to analyze the position of the self-defending
person, one reaches the same conclusions reached by propo-
54. Id. at 528.
55. Rights specification is based on moral specificationism. This thesis was
famously defended by Judith Jarvis Thomson. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A De-
fense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).
56. Since, to my knowledge, I am the only European criminal law theorist to
explicitly support this thesis, I was all the more pleased. I should add that Euro-
pean commentators do not reject or support the rights specification thesis; they
just ignore it. This is but a sign of their reluctance to integrate moral theory in
their analyses. This undoubtedly relates to the idea of criminal law theory being
an independent science with little or no need for outside help. See Dubber, supra
note 12. I am glad to say that this tendency is gradually being overcome.
57. Bergelson, Conditional Rights, supra note 27, at 575; Bergelson, Rights,
supra note 36, at 2498-99.
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nents of the European bipartite structure of criminal law the-
ory. 58 The basic idea is that a person killing in self-defense (or
otherwise justified) is not prima facie wrongfully killing some-
one and then justified. Once the situation is properly specified,
it is plain to see that from the moment she begins her defensive
action she is not really acting against the law. 59 It makes little
sense then to say that she meets the definition of the offense,
and thus her conduct is prima facie prohibited. It is actually
more like she meets the definition of the permission to act in
self-defense, and her conduct is ab initio allowed. 60 This idea
has been the subject of a long, complex, and ultimately rather
useless discussion in European law. Though the results have
not been particularly impressive, the way the discussion devel-
oped merits some space. 61
58. It may come as a surprise to American audiences to read that many Euro-
pean commentators support a bipartite structure. However, it is different than the
one based on the actus realmens rea dichotomy prevalent in common law coun-
tries. Instead of a three-step theory comprising the "definition of an offense,"
"wrongfulness," and "culpability" elements, these commentators prefer to unite the
elements "definition of an offense" and "wrongfulness" into a single larger category
under the same "wrongfulness" name. This approach has been traditionally, and
erroneously, linked to the clumsily named "theory of the negative elements of the
offense" (negative Tatbestandsmerkmale Theorie). In fact, said bipartite structure
can be defended without recourse to that theory. But this is a rather long story.
Suffice it for now to say that although it cannot be considered the prevailing opin-
ion, the bipartite structure does have a large following both in German and Span-
ish criminal law. On Germany, see ROXIN, supra note 44, at 297. Although less
widespread than in Germany, the bipartite structure in Spain has the support of
some of the most prominent commentators. See ORDEIG, supra note 44, at 33-34;
see also DIEGO-MANUEL LUZON PERqA, CURSO DE DERECHO PENAL. PARTE GENERAL
296-301 (1996); SANTIAGO Mm PUIG, DERECHO PENAL. PARTE GENERAL, 164-65,
416-17 (7th ed. 2004); JESYS-MARIA SILVA SANCHEZ, APROXIMACION AL DERECHO
PENAL CONTEMPORANEO 332-33, 390-98 (1992).
59. There are two versions of rights specification theories: normative and fac-
tual. Though I have my doubts about the propriety of the distinction, in the follow-
ing analysis, I will assume factual specification.
60. In fact, she abstractly meets both norms. The legis specialis derogat legi
generalis doctrine, however, intervenes to mandate the application of just the per-
missive and more specific norms (anyone killing in self-defense is also killing, but
the opposite does not hold). Notice that this doctrine intervenes before there is a
specific attacker and a specific defending party. The doctrine extends to all even-
tual norm collision cases. For a wonderful discussion of the logical structure of this
doctrine, see Ulrich Klug, Zum Begriff der Gesetzeskonkurrenz, 68 ZSTW 399
(1956).
61. I have tried to track and dissect this discussion in my contribution to the
Festschrift for Enrique Gimbernat Ordeig. See fRIGO ORTIZ DE URBINA, La Teoria
de los Elementos Negativos del Tipo: Una Invenci6n Juridico-penal?, in EsTUDios
19
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Defenders of the tripartite structure have traditionally re-
lied on a powerful statement by Hans Welzel, father of the theo-
retical approach known as "Finalism" (Finalismus) and one of
the most distinguished German criminal law professors of all
time: killing a person in self-defense and killing a mosquito just
cannot be the same.62 Confronted with this emotive suggestion,
defenders of the bipartite structure have defensively struggled
to prove they are not ethical monsters and have strenuously in-
sisted that they do not mean that it is morally the same. 63
What they assert is that they are the same in terms of the ap-
portioning of criminal liability, and, further, that the fact that a
moral difference between both cases exists does not constitute
sufficient reason to structure the theory of criminal liability in
three, rather than two, stages. Finally, they also insist that a
justified act can be morally better than an act that does not
even meet the definition of an offense. Let me illustrate this
last point with the following situations:
PENALES EN HOMENAJE A ENRIQUE GIMBERNAT, VOL. II 1393 (Garcia Vald~s et al.
eds., 2008).
62. See 1 HANS WELZEL, DAS NEUE BILD DES STRAFRECHTSSYSTEMS: EINE
EINFUHRUNG IN DIE FINALE HANDLUNGSLEHRE 24 (4th ed. 1961). In the second edi-
tion of his textbook, the mosquito was temporarily replaced by a rooster. In the
Spanish edition, the mosquito was lost (or replaced) in translation and Spanish
commentators have since been discussing dead flies instead of dead mosquitoes. I
was somehow disappointed to see that Welzel's example and argument had made
their way into the Anglo-American discussion (strangely enough, in the fly version,
too). See George P. Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, in ACTION AND VALUE IN
CRIMINAL LAw 175, 181 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993).
63. Thus, they concur with Husak. See Douglas N. Husak, Partial Defenses,
11 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 167, 172 (1998) ("No one who believes that killings
in self-defense are completely justified need suppose that the quantum of wrong-
fulness in all such killings is equivalent to that in, say, scratching one's head.").
The idea is also similar to Judith Jarvis Thomson's notion of a "moral residue,"
that is, the possibility of a remaining wrong in a justified act. See THOMSON, supra
note 19, at 84-86. Although I do not share some of his conclusions, I have found
John Oberdiek's discussion of the matter most enlightening. See John Oberdiek,
Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing / Violating Distinction and Its Place in the
Theory of Rights, 23 LAw & PHIL. 325, 330-37 (2004). The idea can be extended to
the legal field, talking about a "legal residue." Justification does not necessarily
extinguish all rights of other parties. This is obvious in the case of necessity (the
legendary cabin owner of the "cabin in the woods/thunder storm" example does not
have to bear the costs of repairing the door broken by the desperate mountaineer
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A) In most European jurisdictions, incest is not a crime in itself
(although incestuous acts can obviously constitute a number of
sexual offenses). Jack and Jill have a legal incestuous relation.
B) In most European jurisdictions, tax fraud is a crime only when
it reaches a certain threshold. David evades an amount a dime
below that threshold.
C) All European jurisdictions grant a justificatory claim to injure
a wrongful attacker in order to protect an innocent's life. Ramon
is about to shoot an innocent person. Risking her own life, Raquel
pushes him to the floor, slightly injuring him in the process.
Raquel's conduct in C is justified, but it also meets the of-
fense definition of slight injury. Jack and Jill in A and David in
B, on the other hand, do not even meet the offense definition.
Should we infer that it is morally better to commit incest or to
defraud a quantity below criminal law's threshold than to push
the assailant in C? That would be ridiculous. Raquel is not
merely legally and morally justified, she is actually a moral
hero as well. Jack and Jill and David, on the other hand, may
not have committed a criminal offense, but they sure are mor-
ally blameworthy. 64
Why am I explaining this admittedly not so fruitful Euro-
pean family feud to American readers? Beyond its obvious
value as a cautionary tale about the pernicious effects of rhetor-
ically inflated language in academic debates, the discussion
helps to show where Bergelson's assertion that specification
theory assumes rights to be absolute is wrong. On this point,
Bergelson stands in great company indeed. Both Joel Fein-
berg65 and Judith Jarvis Thomson 66 share her view that rights
specification assumes rights to be absolute. But I believe that
their assertions are due to the fact that they have an inade-
quate concept of right in mind.
Not only are rights not absolute, but a right is actually not
"a" right. What we call "a" right when we talk about the "right
64. Examples could be multiplied. To my knowledge, this counter-example
strategy was first used by Jesus Silva Sdnchez. See JESOS-MARIA SILVA SANCHEZ,
APROXIMACION AL DERECHO PENAL CONTEMPORANEO 332-33 (1992).
65. Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93 (1978).





to life" or the "property right" is actually a bundle of different
legal entitlements, 67 some of which may well not be rights in the
strictest sense (that is, privileges correlated with a duty). It is
thus incorrect for Bergelson to use the "cabin in the woods" ex-
ample to show the inadequacy of this approach and to infer
that, according to rights specification theory, "the cabin owner's
property rights were limited from the outset and simply did not
exist under the described circumstances. Thus, the mountain-
eer did not infringe on any rights at all."68 According to rights
specification, the cabin owner does not lose every legal entitle-
ment constituting his property right. Necessity defense does
not allow the mountaineer to paint the cabin walls green or to
stay for the summer since he had so much enjoyed his stay. Ne-
cessity defense does not mean that he does not have to pay for
whatever damages he causes either. According to rights specifi-
cation theory, the existence of a necessity defense means that,
in those specific circumstances and while they last, the moun-
taineer does not have a duty not to trespass the cabin owner's
property and thus cannot be successfully prosecuted for that
criminal offense if he chooses to do it. If this is considered
enough in order to talk about an absolute right on the part of
the mountaineer, then rights specification is indeed an absolute
rights theory. But this really seems like a gimmicky way of
talking.69
Returning to the self-defense setting, according to rights
specification theory, the perpetrator's unjust attack does not
mean that he loses whatever rights he has. Even in self-de-
fense, the assailant retains the right to escape. He is under no
duty to assist the self-defending party in bringing him down. In
this specific situation, however, he does not have the right that
67. This was cogently argued by Alf Ross fifty-one years ago. See Alf Ross, Th-
Tit, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1957). Bergelson recognizes this point. See Bergelson,
Conditional Rights, supra note 27, at 578.
68. Bergelson, Conditional Rights, supra note 27, at 576. This assertion leads
her to the wrong conclusion that "if that were the case, the cabin owner would not
be entitled to any compensation for the consumed food or other loss caused by the
mountaineers." Id.
69. Bergelson herself makes the assertion that saying that some rights are
limited means that "they are conditionally limited, but all that really means is that
they are not limited until and unless a certain condition is satisfied." Id. Rights
specificationists could make the same point by saying that when that condition is
met, we are under a different specification.
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the victim does not defend himself, and he does not have the
right to injure the defending victim in order to stop her attack.
I take this all to be quite obvious. That's why I concur with the
European bipartite theory of criminal liability. In criminal law
terms, a justified act means the same as a non-criminal act be-
cause criminal law provisions, when properly specified, do not
hold the justified person to a criminally protected duty.
The former analysis explains why it is also incorrect to re-
fer to the "practical" problem posed by rights specification. Ac-
cording to this objection, since so many different things may
occur, it is hardly thinkable that one could ever completely spec-
ify a right and in fact, no one has ever done so.70 Yet again, this
objection turns into the wrong concept of what "having a right"
means. I agree that it is almost impossible to fully define a
right in the abstract. Moreover, I believe it would be of little
help. But this is nothing specific to rights specification theory.
Take for instance one of its theoretical competitors, forfeiture
theory. Can its proponents claim to be able to produce a closed
list of situations that lead to the right's forfeiture? My answer
is that they cannot, for the same reason that rights specification
cannot offer a precise abstract definition of a right. That list
and that definition will always be amenable to the process of
reflective equilibrium. Just as open texture makes expressions
in natural languages always open to the possibility of becoming
vague, in ethics, a new situation may call for the modification of
the list/specification.
I take Bergelson's (as well as Thomson's and Feinberg's)
contention that rights specification is incompatible with the
idea that rights are not absolute to be either mistaken or very
weak. It is mistaken if it asserts that rights specification is in-
compatible with the idea that rights are bundle-like, and we
may have a right and, at the same time, not have all its entitle-
ments available to us. It is very weak if it asserts that rights
specification affirms that we can generally determine whether
we have a particular entitlement in a specific situation. Rights
specification does say so, but so do all other non-radical ap-
proaches to jurisprudence. Asserting the contrary would mean
denying the possibility of adjudication.




This leaves us with Husak's objection. Husak states that
were Bergelson's proposal to be taken as a form of the rights
specification theory, the principle of conditionality of rights
would be incompatible with another type of approach: forfeiture
theories.71 Whereas the latter tries to explain how existing
rights are lost in certain circumstances, specification theories
assert that in those same circumstances after the specification,
we can see that those rights actually do not exist and thus can-
not be forfeited. According to Husak, the problem is that
Bergelson actually moves back and forth between these two
supposedly incompatible approaches. 72 Sometimes she says
that the victim may reduce his rights, but seldom, if ever, lose
them completely. 73 Other times she says that "a person may
lose some rights due to his own actions.' '74 I think there is a
way out of this conundrum. Let me start with a brief analysis of
forfeiture and specification theories as applied to the self-de-
fense case. Imagine these three scenarios:
Scenario 1: I walk towards you knife in hand, and I stop and stand
still when I am fourteen feet away from you. You point a gun at
me. By walking towards you knife in hand, I have put myself in a
position where the legal system no longer grants me the right not
to be pointed at with a gun. Instead, it grants you a permission to
threaten me in self-defense. 75
Scenario 2: After being pointed at with the gun in scenario one, I
do not stop but keep walking towards you. If I do, you may shoot
me, for by continuing to walk I have put myself in a position
where the legal system does no longer grant me the right not to be
71. Husak, supra note 10, at 528.
72. Id. at 529-31 (offering some examples of Bergelson's equivocal language).
73. Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 465.
74. Id.
75. For the ease of explanation, suppose that standing still fourteen feet away
from you makes me a threat, but a non-immediate one, and suppose that, accord-
ing to the law of the relevant jurisdiction, this means that you cannot yet shoot me,
but you can threaten me (this would be the situation under Spanish law, so it is
not a pure Gedankenexperiment). The reader may change the number of feet.
What is important is that at some point the defending party will have a permission
to threaten but not yet to shoot. See also Bergelson, Conditional Rights, supra
note 27, at 578 ("If I attack you using a stuffed animal as a weapon, I may lose my
right not to be attacked but most likely I will not lose my right not to be killed.
What happened then to my general right not to be harmed? I retained some of the
rights that form it but not all. It became more limited, 'reduced.'").
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shot at. Instead, it grants you a permission to shoot me in self-
defense.
Scenario 3: After being pointed at with the gun in scenario one, I
drop the knife, turn my back, and start to make my way to the
door showing no signs of turning back to you. In this situation,
the legal system not only grants me a right not to be shot at, but
also grants me a right not to be pointed at with a gun (provided I
have walked far enough from you not to constitute an immediate
threat).
Forfeiture theories would say that in the first scenario, I
have forfeited my right not to be pointed at with a gun; in the
second scenario, I have forfeited my right not to be shot at as
well; and in the third scenario, I have regained the right I had
previously forfeited in scenario 1. The specification of rights
thesis, on the other hand, would hold that, properly specified, in
the first scenario, I have no right not to be pointed at with a
gun; in the second scenario, I have no right not to be shot at
either; and in the third scenario, I have both rights. Bergelson's
claim is that rights are always conditional, and this is compati-
ble with both accounts. In the first scenario, I do not have a
right not to be pointed at with a gun (but the fact of not having
that right is conditional on my omission to turn and leave). In
the second scenario, I have no right not to be shot at (but again
this is conditional on the fact of not turning and leaving). In the
third scenario, I have the right not to be pointed or shot at with
a gun (but these rights are conditional on not posing a threat to
you). Think of the three scenarios in geographical terms for a
moment. By moving (literally) from scenario 1 to either scena-
rio 2 or scenario 3, I enter into a different deontic space, mean-
ing that in each of these settings my conduct is differently
defined by the legal system. But it all depends on what I do.
The fact that we describe what I do when moving from scenario
1 to scenario 2 as losing the right to life, or as saying that as
long as I am in that scenario I do not have all the entitlements
available, is completely irrelevant. As shown by the situation
resulting when moving from scenario 2 to scenario 3, the legal
system's handling of the situations forces forfeiture theories to
admit that lost rights may be regained.76 Other than that, both
76. I believe this explains the first of Bergelson's two caveats to the "forfei-




theories provide equally valid descriptions of the situation.
Nothing substantive depends on choosing one over the other.
Where then does the problem lie? Has someone as bright as
Professor Husak missed something?
I believe Professor Husak's perplexity has its origin in
Bergelson's contention that in claiming that rights can be re-
duced, she does not mean that the right not to be harmed "may
suddenly drop from 100% to 70%."77 Husak rightfully asks
what she does mean.78 I think I can help to answer the question
by using a German criminal law distinction.
German criminal law distinguishes the concepts of Recht-
swidrigkeit and Unrecht. The former is usually translated into
English as "wrongfulness,"7 9 and the latter we can translate as
"wrongful." The first concept (Rechtswidrigkeit) is dichotomous:
a conduct is either wrongful or it isn't, depending on whether it
represents an unjustified breach of other people's rights or it
doesn't. In more precise terms, a conduct either exhibits the
quality of wrongfulness or it doesn't. The second concept (Un-
recht) is a degree concept and admits further differentiations.
So to say, wrongful conduct can be differently wrongful. Mur-
dering, lightly injuring, and stealing an apple from a fruit stand
in La Gran Via in Madrid are all against the law; they all are
Rechtswidrig. However, it makes perfect sense to inquire about
the relative magnitude of the wrong (Unrecht) they represent,
to question how wrongful each of these conducts is.80
their complete forfeiture. A right that has been lost may be regained; 'forfeit' sug-
gests that the right has been lost forever." Bergelson, Conditional Rights, supra
note 27, at 577.
77. Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 465.
78. Husak, supra note 10, at 529.
79. I believe "unlawfulness" would be a better translation, but "wrongfulness"
seems to have established itself. Some German commentators object to translat-
ing Rechtswidrigkeit as "unlawfulness" because "[tlo an American reader, this
might suggest that Rechtswidrigkeit has to do only with the state or condition of
being inconsistent with positive law. The German term Recht, which means both
'law' and 'right' has moral overtones that are independent of positive law."
Naucke, supra note 12, at 311 n.13. Contrary to Naucke's desires, I want to be
understood as talking about the condition of being inconsistent with existing law.
If translating Rechtswidrigkeit as "wrongfulness" gives another impression, then I
definitely support translating it as "unlawfulness."
80. I am aware that American commentators would just talk of the diverse
"wrongfulness" of different actions. However, in this subsection I am using
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A partial justification operates to diminish the conduct's
wrongful character, but does not affect the wrongfulness of the
conduct. That conduct is still forbidden but is considered to be
"not that wrong."81 Take for example the Spanish criminal
code's regulation of consent to injury. Section 155 establishes
that if the injured party has validly (and "freely, spontaneously,
and expressly") consented to the injury, the perpetrator's pun-
ishment will be diminished one or two degrees.8 2 The Spanish
criminal code does not recognize consent to injury as a complete
defense, but it does recognize that it is not the same to injure
with or without the consent of the injured party. It recognizes
that these conducts, both being against the law in formal terms,
are albeit differently wrongful. In this case, as in all cases of
partial defense, the conduct partially justified or partially ex-
cused remains prohibited. In other words, the legal system does
not declare the rights involved fair game. What changes is their
level of protection. If the conduct is not partially justified or
partially excused, the rights holder knows that anyone infring-
ing his rights will have to face the full sanction. In the presence
of a partial defense, however, they will have to face a lesser
sanction. Husak says that "[i]f the perpetrator does not contra-
vene any rights of his victim because the victim has lost
whatever right the perpetrator might otherwise infringe or vio-
late, victim fault should be a complete defense to a crime."8 3
But there is no need to understand that the victim has lost
"whatever right the perpetrator might otherwise infringe or vio-
late."8 4 Partial defenses on the part of the perpetrator do not
neutralize the victim's rights, but they don't leave them intact
"wrongfulness" as a dichotomous concept in order to make my conceptual point. I
ask the reader to bear with me for a few more lines.
81. This analysis supports Bergelson's defense of the possibility of a partial
justification. See Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 410. ("The fact that, despite
a valid defense, we still condemn the defendant's act means only that his defense is
partial; it does not determine the nature of the defense.").
82. See supra note 50.
83. Husak, supra note 10, at 531.
84. Husak seems to believe that Bergelson understands that the defense of
comparative criminal liability can only be partial, but this is not right. See Bergel-




either. The sanction in case they are breached is less than it
would be in the absence of the perpetrator's partial defense.85
B. The Substantive Content of the Conditionality of Rights
Principle
I believe Bergelson's conditionality of rights principle sur-
vives objections based on rights theory. But is it an interesting
option? I seriously doubt it. This principle just tells us that we
do not have absolute rights. You may or may not agree with
this statement. But even if you agree, as I do, it does not tell us
anything interesting. Specifically, it does not tell us what the
appropriate extent of our rights is, and it cannot tell us when it
would be appropriate to take the victim's conduct into account
either. To serve as a guide in the resolution of practical
problems, that principle needs to be supplemented. In the case
of the voluntary rights reduction, Bergelson rests on the norma-
tive strength of consent. In the case of the involuntary rights
reduction, Bergelson supplements the conditionality of rights
principle with another principle, stating that "the offender's lia-
bility may be mitigated by the conduct of the victim only if the
offender has the right that the victim does not behave that
way."8 6 These supplements may seem like minor adjustments
of a previously articulated principle, but they aren't. These as-
sertions, in fact, carry all the normative weight to an otherwise
empty formal structure.8 7
85. Reconstructing the situation as a case of rights specification or rights for-
feiture does not change things either, for we have already seen that both recon-
structions are equivalent in deontic terms. In the case of a complete defense,
specification theory would say that concrete entitlement was not available in the
specific situation, and forfeiture theory would say that it was there but was for-
feited. In the case of a partial defense, specification theory would say that the
right correctly specified does not receive full protection, whereas forfeiture theory
would say that it did receive full protection, but the person in question forfeited
part of that protection.
86. Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 474.
87. See Harel, supra note 13, at 499 n.19. ("[It is important to understand
that Bergelson's conviction that the involuntary reduction of rights triggered by
the victim's behavior presupposes the victim's violation of a right is not logically or
conceptually derived from the principle of conditionality of rights."). However,
Harel continues by saying that the formal principle "asserts that there are victim-
specific powers to extinguish or reduce the duties owed to the victim." Id. I have
already shown the impossibility of conceptualizing self-defense as such a power.
See supra Part II.
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Bergelson is right when, after reviewing the doctrines of
consent, self-defense, and provocation, she concludes that her
analysis "demonstrates a common principle underlying all three
defenses and perhaps criminal law in general, the principle of
conditionality of our rights."88 She may be too right. The princi-
ple of conditionality of rights underlies these doctrines and
criminal law in general, as well as all law, for the truth of this
proposition lies in the fact that rights are not absolute. How-
ever, the extent of rights does not only depend on the conduct of
the victim or the perpetrator, notwithstanding how these two
agents are defined. Their extent also depends on other non-
human events, such as the breakout of a fire or a thunderstorm.
In these cases, the criminal liability of eventual perpetrators is
also modified. The person that pushes another person while
rushing out of a department store to escape a fire and the
mountaineer breaking the door and entering in the cabin in our
favorite out-in-the-woods example also see their criminal liabil-
ity diminished or even extinguished, though no victim partici-
pation is involved. There might be a common underlying
principle to the three institutions that form Bergelson's theory
building blocks, which lends support to her plea for a general
theory of comparative criminal liability. However, it cannot be
one characteristic, the conditionality of rights, that is shared,
not only by these three criminal law institutions, but also by
every other law institution.
To complicate things, it is highly doubtful that all instances
of Bergelson's unifying trait, the victim's conduct, can meaning-
fully be considered to really be an instance of the same thing:
legally valid consenting victims, attackers turned victims, and
provokers form a motley group. That makes some of Bergel-
son's additional arguments not very convincing.
Take for instance the assertion that comparative criminal
liability is demanded by consistency. Demanding consistency
always seems a very reasonable thing to do, and so the argu-
ment is prima facie attractive. Bergelson points out two differ-
ent types of inconsistency. On the one hand, there is the
"external" inconsistency of admitting such defense in tort law




but not in criminal law. 9 On the other hand, the "internal" in-
consistency of allowing some criminal defendants to raise a
claim of comparative responsibility (as in the doctrines of con-
sent, self-defense, and provocation) while denying others the op-
portunity to do so (by refusing the doctrine of comparative
negligence to play a role in the apportioning of criminal
liability).90
Her demand for external consistency, however, has to be
reassessed in light of the fact that consistency does not require
things to be equal. Without this important precision, the de-
mand for consistency would result in inadmissible conse-
quences. For instance, it would demand the admission of strict
liability in criminal law (or, conversely, its ban from tort law).
But this would be absurd. The whole point of having tort law
and criminal law as two different institutions is that they serve
different ends and do so through different means. Consistency
among tort law and criminal law cannot and does not mean that
a doctrine or institution admitted by one has to be admitted by
the other as well. What it means is that existing differences
have to be accounted for by their different goals. In tort law,
the reduction in the recovery of the victim can plausibly be un-
derstood as a corrective-justice limitation to her right to obtain
recovery, for tort law is not intended to be an instrument to deal
with retributive requirements. However, this latter function is
the main function of criminal law. This alone gives reason to
think that the tort analogy is less helpful than it might appear
at first glance. 91
Let's turn to "internal consistency" now. As a foreign
reader, I was quite shocked to read Bergelson's description of
the incoherent regulation of provocation in United States law.92
I agree with her and Husak93 that there is no point in admitting
the relevance of provocation in one case (killing) while denying
it in others (assault, destruction of property). The situation is
completely ludicrous. However, this consistency problem is spe-
cific to the regulation of provocation and does not say anything
89. See id. at 446-53.
90. See id. at 432-35. See also Hurd, supra note 15, at 507-08.
91. See Simons, supra note 13, at 549.
92. Bergelson, Victims, supra note 7, at 432-35.
93. Husak, supra note 10, at 523 n.4.
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about the admission of comparative liability in criminal law.
The problem of consistency should be addressed, allowing prov-
ocation to have general effects (or no effects, though I consider
this second inconsistency-avoiding solution to be inferior in
terms of fairness). In deciding this, I do not see the point to
recur to the very different situations of consent and the situa-
tion of the attacking party in self-defense settings.
In her response to the first generation of her critics, Bergel-
son declared to be "somewhat puzzled that Harel and Simons
refuse to see the conceptual link between the doctrines of con-
sent, self-defense, and, to some degree (since it is only in part a
defense of justification), provocation."94 Still, she immediately
adds that "[wlhile these doctrines apply to different circum-
stances, they have a similar effect on one's rights and, through
that, on the attribution of harm and imposition of liability."95
Now it's my turn to be puzzled. I am puzzled that Bergelson
refuses to see that many doctrines that have nothing to do with
victim conduct also have a say on one's rights and on the attri-
bution of liability. Nobody disputes that personal interaction in
the cases of consent, self-defense, and provocation can have
those effects. This is old wine. What is contentious is that a
conceptual link between these doctrines can be found, which at
the same time is not present in some other institutions, such as
duress or necessity, that also affect one's rights and the appor-
tioning of criminal liability. Bergelson's magnificent work of-
fers a truly overwhelming number of insightful analyses. But
so far I believe she has not offered that conceptual link, and
thus her analysis is really old wine in new wineskins.
94. Bergelson, Conditional Rights, supra note 27, at 572 (footnotes omitted).
95. Id.
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